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INTRODUCTION
Involuntary commitment case law continues to demonstrate that
mental illness is not only a physical and psychological affliction, but
also a de facto legal status.1 Suffering from or being diagnosed with—
that is, being alleged to have—a mental illness makes one eligible for
involuntary treatment, including inpatient commitment tantamount in
many ways to incarceration.2
The key difference between
incarceration and commitment is that a person must be adjudged
beyond a reasonable doubt to have actually committed a crime to be
incarcerated for a set period, whereas members of a select, frequently
institutionalized class, the mentally disabled, may be confined
indefinitely upon a physician’s assessment that they may at some
future date commit a harmful act.3 Mental disabilities affect a
remarkably broad range of New Yorkers: a recent survey by the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)
found that 430,000 New Yorkers—7.3% of the City’s population—
suffered from a major depressive disorder, and 200,000 or 3.5% of the
City’s population suffered from a generalized anxiety disorder.4
1. This Note will try to refer to whatever facts courts include regarding the
reasons why a person has been committed, in order to give a practical sense of what it
“takes” to be involuntarily committed. This is intended partly to support the
proposition that otherwise innocuous or sympathetic behavior can become a pretext
for “fenc[ing] in . . . those whose ways are different.” See O’Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice

Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law
Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 13 (1999) (remarking that
cases and statutes, taken at face value, tell us “virtually nothing” about “how mental
disability law is actually applied . . . and why it is applied that way”).
2. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (describing involuntary
commitment as a “massive curtailment of liberty” requiring due process protection).
In addition to losing their freedom from physical restraint, committees lose their First
and Fourth Amendment rights as well as have their right to object to medication
severely restricted. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sharp, No. 10-5245 (FSH), 2011 WL 1045234,
at *8–10 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2011) (describing the “limited” rights of involuntary
committees to be free from searches and mail screening); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291, 299 n.16 (1982) (involuntary patients’ interest in objecting to medication
limited by state interests).
3. See infra Part I.A.2.
4. Division of Mental Hygiene, NYC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & MENTAL
HYGIENE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/dmh/dmh-mental_illness.shtml (last
visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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Another 6.3% reported “nonspecific psychological distress.”5 Even
more troubling, a 2005 DOHMH survey of teenagers found that 9.6%
of respondents had attempted suicide within the past twelve months.6
Under current state law standards, any of these conditions could
make one eligible for involuntary civil commitment.7 State law
designates twenty-seven hospitals for inpatient treatment of mental
illness under the direction of the Office of Mental Health (OMH).8 A
2009 report by OMH indicated that 173,682 New Yorkers were
receiving treatment in residential OMH programs, including 12,853 in
inpatient residential treatment facilities.9 Despite the fact that mental
disability affects an enormous percentage of its population, New York
State’s statutory scheme for involuntary confinement of the mentally
disabled, Mental Hygiene Law Article 910 (Article 9) is among the
least rights-protective in the country, allocating an enormous amount
of discretion to physicians.11 Periodically, patients and advocacy
organizations have challenged this arrangement, but since the Second
Circuit found Article 9 facially valid in Project Release v. Prevost,12
District Courts have upheld it consistently.13
This Note will examine New York State’s involuntary civil
commitment statute, Mental Hygiene Law Article 9, in light of
developments in the due process case law and scientific literature
relating to involuntary commitment since the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals last heard a wholesale facial challenge to the statute in
Project Release. Part I will analyze New York State’s commitment
law in its constitutional context.
Part I.A will analyze the
constitutional framework around which New York’s statute is
constructed, starting with the Supreme Court’s foundational rulings in
O’Connor v. Donaldson,14 Addington v. Texas,15 and Vitek v. Jones,16
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra Part I.B. The legal standards are codified in NEW YORK MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 9.01.
8. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 7.17(b) (McKinney 2011).
9. See PCS Summary Reports—Survey Week 2009, N.Y. ST. OFFICE MENTAL
HEALTH, http://bi.omh.ny.gov/pcs/Summary%20Reports?pageval=prog-res&yearval
=2009 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
10. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.01–9.63.
11. See infra Part II.
12. 722 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1983).
13. See, e.g., Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
14. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
15. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
16. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

GROENDYK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

552

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:50 PM

[Vol. XL

and taking account of more recent developments in cases like Kansas
v. Hendricks17 and United States v. Comstock.18 This Note will
comment on the police and parens patriae powers that underpin
different parts of the Mental Hygiene law, and the due process
implications attendant on each. Part I.B will break down the
involuntary commitment statute section by section to illustrate how
the legislature has attempted to meet minimum due process standards
set out by the Supreme Court. Part II will compare Article 9 and the
state and federal case law interpreting it with other states’ involuntary
commitment schemes and rights-protective judicial doctrines that
courts interpreting these schemes have adopted. Through this
comparison, this Note concludes that New York’s commitment
scheme is unusually under-protective of the rights of the mentally ill,
leaving excessive discretion to psychiatrists and providing insufficient
procedural protection, and that the inevitable result is
unconstitutional over-commitment.19 Part II necessarily will revisit
Project Release v. Prevost20 in detail, highlighting key areas of the
Second Circuit’s reasoning that have been so undermined since the
case was decided that the decision should be overturned or modified.
In light of this conclusion, Part III proposes an increased role for
Section 1983 and ADA Title II actions against psychiatrists and
institutions. This Note will consider how these case-by-case litigationbased strategies, though not as effective as legislative action to amend
Article 9 directly, have the potential to indirectly shape a more
protective limiting norm and shield New York’s mentally ill from
over-commitment.

17. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
18. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
19. See Ruth E. Ross et al., A Framework for Classifying State Involuntary
Commitment Statutes, 27 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH 341 (1996) (applying a
statistical analysis to state mental facility admission rates, and finding that states with
more stringent statutory guidelines for involuntary confinement had lower rates of
admission). “Over-commitment” is used in this Note as a term of art to refer to the
commitment of mentally ill individuals who have been misdiagnosed as meeting the
minimum constitutional requirement of “dangerousness to self or others.” See supra
Part I.A.1.
20. 722 F.2d 960 (1983).
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I. ARTICLE 9 AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
CONFINEMENT
A. The Federal Framework
Prior to the 1970s, courts played a minimal role in the civil
commitment process, leaving the standards and procedures by which
patients could be confined against their will largely to the discretion
of state legislatures and mental health professionals.21 In the early
1970s, landmark civil rights cases like Wyatt v. Stickney22 and Lessard
v. Schmidt23 ushered in a “de-institutionalization movement”24 in
which state and federal courts, and eventually the United States
Supreme Court,25 began to identify the procedural and substantive
rights of individuals diagnosed as mentally disabled. Throughout the
1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court enunciated a general
framework of minimum constitutional standards that state
21. See William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and
Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment
Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 260 (2010).
22. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
23. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., Involuntary Commitment, A Delicate
Balance, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 37 (2006) (briefly summarizing the
movement).
According to some commentators, the “de-institutionalization
movement” culminated in Congressional action to protect the rights of the mentally
disabled. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the
ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997) (discussing the
Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (2006), and the
Protection and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Act (PAMI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801–10851
(2006)). While these statutes gesture toward rights protection, they generally do not
create privately enforceable rights. See id. at 948; see also Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 8 (1981).
25. In one of the first Supreme Court cases to deal directly with the constitutional
implications of involuntary commitment, Justice Blackmun observed, “Considering
the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
constitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated.”
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.22 (1972) (citing a congressional report from
1961 indicating that, at that time, “90% of the approximately 800,000 patients in
mental hospitals in this country had been involuntarily committed”). The Jackson
Court, which dealt with a federal prisoner challenging his transfer to a mental facility,
did not reach the question of substantive qualifications for commitment in the
absence of a criminal conviction, but did observe that due process imposed limits on
the state’s power to confine the mentally ill. Id. at 719, 736–38. Justice Blackmun’s
observation could be seen as “opening the courthouse door to persons with mental
disabilities,” setting the stage for the subsequent “explosion of litigation” on
involuntary commitment. Perlin, supra note 1, at 10–11.
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involuntary commitment schemes must meet in order to protect those
rights.26 This framework is oriented around two distinctions: first, the
distinction between “dangerous” and “nondangerous” mental illness;
and second, the distinction between a mentally disabled individual’s
liberty interests and the general interests of society.

1.

Substantive limits—O’Connor, Addington, and the “Danger”
Standard

The first distinction comes from O’Connor v. Donaldson.27
Kenneth Donaldson’s father committed him to the Florida State
Hospital at Chattahoochee based on “scanty” evidence that
Donaldson suffered from “delusions,” under a Florida statute that
authorized commitment of anyone adjudged “incompetent by reason
of mental illness.”28
Donaldson repeatedly but unsuccessfully
demanded his release throughout nearly fifteen years of involuntary
confinement before finally bringing a Section 1983 claim against the
hospital for damages and injunctive relief.29 Upholding Donaldson’s
claim, the Supreme Court held that “a State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.”30 Because the trial court had
determined that Donaldson, even if mentally ill, was not dangerous to
himself or others, the hospital had violated his constitutional right to
freedom.31 Although this holding establishes the substantive right of
“nondangerous” mentally ill (or allegedly mentally ill) individuals to
live in “the private community,”32 the O’Connor Court expressly
declined to decide “whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally
ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds
which . . . are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement
of such a person—to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own
survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness.”33
Although O’Connor left the substantive and procedural
requirements of lawful involuntary commitment to be resolved in

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1, at 11.
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).

Id. at 565–66 & n.2.
See id. at 565–66; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
See id.
See id. at 575.
See id. at 573–74.
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later cases, the Court did elaborate on the grounds upon which States
might predicate commitment. As implied by the justifications listed
above, confinement generally rests on the police and/or parens
patriae powers.34 The police power generally justifies confinement to
protect others from the individual,35 while the parens patriae power
justifies confinement for the protection of the individual from himself
(or from his own inability to survive without state intervention).36
Although the Court noted that these two powers are distinct and
entail different due process limitations,37 it did not identify how those
different limitations might affect the State’s power to confine.38 State
civil commitment statutes, amended to comply with O’Connor’s
“dangerousness” requirement, do not distinguish between the two
justifications, and generally apply to anyone determined to be
“dangerous to self or others.”39
34. See id. at 582–83 (Burger, J., concurring) (“[T]he States are vested with the
historic parens patriae power, including the duty to protect ‘persons under legal
disabilities to act for themselves’ . . . [t]he classic example of his role is when a State
undertakes to act as ‘the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics.’” (citing
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972))); see also id. at 575 (majority
opinion).
35. See id. at 582–83 (“There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police
power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of
significant antisocial acts or communicable disease.”); see also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
36. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 583 (Burger, J., concurring). New York State
explicitly announces its parens patriae power over the mentally disabled in its
constitution. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 4; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 7.01
(McKinney 2011); id. § 9.47 (stating that it is the duty of local officers to see that “all
mentally ill persons within their respective communities who are in need of care and
treatment at a hospital” receive such treatment); id. § 9.21(a) (standing for the
proposition that it is “the duty of all state and local officers having duties to perform
relating to the mentally ill to encourage any person suitable therefor and in need of
care and treatment for mental illness to apply for admission as a voluntary or
informal patient”).
37. See O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 583 (Burger, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of
alternative forms of protection may be motivated by different considerations, and the
justifications for one may not be invoked to rationalize another.”).
38. The Court did, however, identify certain specific limitations on states’ parens
patriae power. See id. at 575 (majority opinion) (“[W]hile the State may arguably
confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary
condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends.”); id. at 583 (Burger, J.,
concurring) (“At a minimum, a particular scheme for protection of the mentally ill
must rest upon a legislative determination that it is compatible with the best interests
of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for themselves.”).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37, 9.39 (McKinney 2011). New
York’s standards of dangerousness are compared with those of other states’ in Part
II, infra.
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Significantly, Justice Burger’s concurrence also recognized the
difficulty involved in both defining “mental illness” and diagnosing
individuals as “dangerous.”40 How these terms are defined is
obviously vital to giving O’Connor’s holding meaning, but because
both issues had been resolved by the jury below, the O’Connor court
did not address them further.41
The second major distinction underlying the constitutional
framework for civil commitment is the one between the liberty
interests of mentally disabled individuals and the interests of society
at large.42 In a civil commitment hearing, these interests must be
balanced by allocating the risk of an erroneous commitment between
the individual and the State.43 In Addington, a woman committed her
son, a man with a history of “mental and emotional difficulties,” after
he had an “assaultive episode” and damaged property.44 Challenging
his commitment before a jury, Addington conceded that he suffered
from mental illness but claimed that the State had not presented
sufficient evidence to establish that he was dangerous.45 The court
instructed the jury that Addington could be committed if the medical
testimony constituted “clear and convincing evidence” that he
required hospitalization, and the jury found that this burden had been
met.46 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected Addington’s argument
that the “clear and convincing” standard of proof inadequately
protected him from the risk of an erroneous finding of
dangerousness.47 In so doing, the Court distinguished the interests at
play in criminal proceedings, which require the state to establish
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, from those in civil commitments.48

40. See 422 U.S. at 584 & n.6 (Burger, J., concurring) (citing Thomas Szasz, The
Right to Health, 57 GEO. L.J. 734 (1969)).
41. Id. at 573–74.
42. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“In considering what
standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, we must assess both the
extent of the individual’s interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and
the state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a particular
standard of proof.”).
43. Id. at 423.
44. Id. at 420–21.
45. Id. The State called two physicians, each of whom expressed the opinion that
Addington suffered from “psychotic schizophrenia” with “paranoid tendencies,” was
“probably dangerous to himself and to others,” and required “hospitalization in a
closed area.” Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 432–33.
48. Id. at 423.
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The standard of proof represents not only the value that society
places on an individual’s liberty,49 but also the weight of the state’s
interest in confinement. By applying the “clear and convincing”
standard of proof, the Court simultaneously held that the interest that
a nondangerous mentally disabled individual has in remaining free
from unnecessary restraint is weaker than that of an innocent
individual accused of a crime,50 and that the state’s interest in
confining the mentally disabled is qualitatively different from its
interest in confining criminals.51
O’Connor and Addington establish the two basic axes. Mentally ill
individuals cannot be confined unless they reach a certain threshold
of dangerousness, achieved either by posing a sufficient threat to
society to justify the exercise of state police power or by being
sufficiently incapable of caring for themselves to justify an exercise of
state parens patriae power.52 The sufficiency of that showing of

49. Id. at 425.
50. See id. at 428–29. This conclusion is premised on the assumption that the
mentally disabled, unlike the wrongly convicted, stand to gain from their
confinement. See id. at 430 (observing that the difficulty in predicting dangerousness
“beyond a reasonable doubt” could force fact finders to “reject commitment for
many patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care” and that
“[s]uch ‘freedom’ for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price”). The
court also assumes that “the layers of professional review and observation of the
patient’s condition, and the concern of family and friends generally will provide
continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected.” Id. at 428–
29. This observation ignores the possibility that “professional review” may be tainted
by treatment bias. See infra Part II.B.2. It also overlooks the fact that it was
Addington’s own mother who had him committed.
51. See id. at 428 (“In a civil commitment [as opposed to a criminal proceeding]
state power is not exercised in a punitive sense.”). Comparative benevolence thus
grants the state broader license to confine.
52. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court later
clarified that O’Connor and Addington established mental illness and danger as
separate prerequisites to civil confinement, both of which must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76, 86 (1992)
(holding that due process does not allow an individual with an “antisocial
personality,” who has been adjudged dangerous, to be involuntarily committed
absent a showing of some treatable mental illness). A “sane” person who has not
committed a crime is thus ineligible for civil confinement regardless of how
predictably dangerous he or she may be. See id. But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346, 358–60 (1997) (permitting commitment on a finding of dangerousness
coupled with an untreatable “mental abnormality”). Although Hendricks initially
seems to abrogate the two-step Foucha standard, both the majority and dissent point
out that Kansas’ definition of “abnormality” falls within the permissible range of
definitions of “mental illness” for substantive due process purposes, which must only
pertain to an individual’s ability to control his “dangerous” behavior. See id. at 359
(majority opinion); id. at 373–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kansas v. Crane,
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dangerousness is determined by balancing the state’s interest in
confining the genuinely dangerous against the liberty interest of
individuals who may be confined erroneously. To some extent, this
balance allocates the risk of over-commitment to the mentally
disabled population.53
O’Connor and Addington intersect at the concept of
“dangerousness.”54 Under this standard, a commitment is legitimate
if a fact finder (either a physician certifying an initial commitment or
a judge or jury at a recommitment hearing)55 can conclude that there
is clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual is
dangerous.
Legislatures authorizing civil commitment through
statutes like Article 9 must work within those bounds, but their
contours remain vague.56 What, for example, makes a person
534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (clarifying that Kansas v. Hendricks requires a showing of
some, but not “total,” lack of control to establish “mental illness” for civil
confinement purposes). But see Brian J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A

Workable Standard for “Mental Illness” or a Push Down the Slippery Slope Toward
State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 321–22 & n.17 (1998)
(arguing that the Court’s increased deference to legislatures’ definition of “mental
illness” detaches civil commitment “from the medical model of illness and bona fide
treatment” and could lead to abuse of states’ confinement powers (quoting John Q.
La Fond, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the
Theraputic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 698–99
(1992))).
53. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427. The Court has recognized that erroneously
confined individuals suffer not only from arbitrary confinement, but also from stigma
and a variety of other adverse consequences. See id. at 425–26; see also Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a
mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of
the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness,
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.”).
These “deprivations of liberty” are described with specificity in Part I.B infra.
54. Justice Brennan summarized the complex balancing of interests embodied in
this concept in Jones v. United States:
The core of both cases [O’Connor and Addington] is a balance of three
factors: the governmental interest in isolating and treating those who may
be mentally ill and dangerous; the difficulty of proving or disproving mental
illness and dangerousness in court; and the massive intrusion on individual
liberty that involuntary psychiatric hospitalization entails.
463 U.S. 354, 372 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See infra Part I.A.2.
56. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431 (“The essence of federalism is that states must
be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a
common, uniform mold. As the substantive standards for civil commitment may vary
from state to state, procedures must be allowed to vary so long as they meet the
constitutional minimum.”); see also La Fond, supra note 52 (describing the dangers
of leaving excessive discretion to legislatures to define the terms of confinement). But
see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968) (noting, with regard to a state
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“dangerous” within the standard’s definition? Clear and convincing
evidence of “dangerousness” is required under Addington, but can a
psychiatric prognosis alone be “clear and convincing”? As Part III of
this Note will demonstrate, each state’s civil commitment statute
resolves these questions differently.

2.

Procedural Limits—Vitek v. Jones.

In Vitek v. Jones,57 the Court established the minimum procedural
protections required for involuntary commitment, without further
clarifying the substantive O’Connor dangerousness standard. Vitek
dealt with a prisoner58 convicted of robbery who, one year into a
three-to-nine year sentence, had been transferred without notice or
hearing to an inpatient mental facility to be committed until no longer
dangerous.59 The Court held that despite requiring a finding of
dangerousness (by a prison psychiatrist), the Nebraska statute
imposed “the kind of deprivations of liberty that require[d]
procedural protections.”60 Specifically, due process requires: (1)
notice; (2) a hearing with the opportunity to rebut evidence relied on
for the transfer; (3) the ability to present and cross-examine
witnesses; (4) the ability to appear before an independent decisionmaker; (5) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence
relied on for transfer; and (6) effective and timely notice of all the

insanity defense standard, that “[n]othing could be less fruitful than for this Court to
be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms . . . . It is
simply not yet the time to write the Constitutional formulas cast in terms whose
meaning . . . is not yet clear either to doctors or to lawyers.”).
57. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
58. While this case, like Jackson v. Indiana, dealt with the commitment of a
convicted prisoner, the Court pointed out that involuntary commitment represents a
“massive curtailment of liberty” that is qualitatively different from incarceration. Id.
at 491 (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”). Because being classified
as mentally ill entails stigmatization and compulsory behavior modification
treatment, neither prisoners nor ordinary citizens can be committed without the due
process protections the Vitek Court went on to define. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493; see
also Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995).
59. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 484. Vitek was found to be “suffering from a mental
illness” by prison psychiatrists after setting fire to his mattress while in solitary
confinement. Id.
60. Id. at 494.
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foregoing rights.61 A plurality of Justices also found that independent,
state-funded counsel must be provided for indigent committees.62
The Vitek Court reiterated the underlying balance of interests
between patient and state and acknowledged that the procedural
protections it adopted were necessary to safeguard against the risk of
being “arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to
unwelcome treatment.”63 Significantly, the Court highlighted the
importance of independent fact-finders and adversary hearings in
what could be seen as an “essentially medical” inquiry into mental
illness.64
Qualifying the Addington Court’s observation that
diagnoses of mental illness “turn[] on the meaning of the facts which
must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists,”65 the
majority held that “[i]t is precisely ‘[t]he subtleties and nuances of
psychiatric diagnoses’ that justify the requirement of adversary
hearings” with independent decision-makers.66 In a case where a jury
had not already made an assessment of dangerousness—unlike in
O’Connor or Addington—the Court was moved to observe that due
process cannot be satisfied where all fact-finding is left to
unconstrained medical discretion.67
61. See id. at 494–96.
62. See id. at 496–97. The plurality, led by Justice White, found that indigent
prisoners thought to be suffering from “mental disease or defect” were likely to be
unable to understand or exercise their rights, making state-funded counsel
appropriate. Id. Justice Powell agreed that appointed assistance should be provided
at pre-transfer hearings, but that due process did not require that assistance to come
from “a licensed attorney.” See id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 495 (majority opinion).
64. See id.
65. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis omitted).
66. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 430).
67. But cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (holding that
“treatment decisions” made by medical professionals are “presumptively valid,” and
should only be “second-guessed” by judges and juries if they are “a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 544 (1979) (“[Courts] should not ‘second-guess the expert administrators on
matters on which they are better informed.’” (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118,
124 (2d Cir 1978))). The Youngberg case dealt with the “post-commitment” liberty
interests of institutionalized individuals, and its presumption of validity was not
discussed in the context of a commitment decision or dangerousness finding. See
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324; see also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the

“Experts”: From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment
Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 667–69 (1992) (distinguishing between the precommitment “negative right” to be free from constraint and Youngberg’s “positive
right” to treatment in a psychiatric institution, and determining that professional
judgment is only relevant when establishing whether the latter has been adequately
protected).
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Since Vitek, the Court has not significantly revisited the
substantive or procedural limitations on involuntary commitment.
Although the extent to which states can define “dangerousness” has
been litigated frequently since the early 1980s, the Court’s minor
modifications to the O’Connor standard in Foucha v. Louisiana68 and
Kansas v. Hendricks69 provide little additional guidance.70 In its most
recent opinion dealing with civil commitment—interpreting a federal
sex offender commitment statute—the Court explicitly left the states’
“leeway” untouched.71
Each state legislature, including New York’s, has dealt differently
with “dangerousness” and the minimum procedural requirements for
civil commitment.72 Having identified the intentionally indistinct
constitutional framework on which it rests, the next section will
examine Article 9 itself. A provision-by-provision breakdown will
help reveal the extent to which the state legislature has used

68. See 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
69. See 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)
(clarifying Hendricks).
70. See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (“[T]he Constitution’s safeguards of human
liberty in the area of mental illness and the law are not always best enforced through
precise bright-line rules. For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in
defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an individual
eligible for commitment.”).
71. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (“In resolving
that question [whether a statute authorizing commitment of individuals who (1) have
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct, (2) currently suffer from
a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder, and (3) are sexually dangerous to
others], we assume, but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—
such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these
circumstances. In other words, we assume for argument’s sake that the Federal
Constitution would permit a State to enact this statute . . . .” (citing Addington, 441
U.S. 418 (1979))). This language is particularly significant in light of the district
court’s ruling that the showing of a past act or attempt of sexually violent conduct
must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by clear and convincing
evidence, given that the proceeding could result in “the taking of an individual’s
liberty.” See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 552 (E.D.N.C. 2007),
aff’d, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
The Supreme Court overturned the District Court on other grounds, declining an
opportunity to overrule Addington. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; see also Alex
Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 254–55
(2011) (lamenting that the Comstock Court missed an opportunity to reevaluate
Addington in light of recent studies casting doubt on psychiatrists’ ability to make
accurate predictions of dangerousness).
72. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 2011) (defining
“likelihood to result in serious harm” to self or others for the purposes of Article 9
commitments).
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commitment standards to allocate the risk of erroneous commitment
to New York’s mentally disabled population.
B.

How Article 9 Works

There are, in general, three ways to be committed to an inpatient
mental institution under New York law: voluntarily,73 involuntarily,74
and through emergency commitment.75 Each entails a different set of
procedures, forms, and minimum and maximum periods of
confinement.76 The legal status under which a person is committed is
recorded in his or her medical record77 and determines the type of
program in which he or she can receive treatment.78 A committee’s
status may change during his hospitalization, but any change in status
entails its own set of assessments and procedures.79 This Part will deal
with each statutory status separately.

1.

Voluntary Commitment

Voluntary commitment can happen either informally80 or by
Informal voluntary commitment is not terribly
application.81
intrusive, requiring no written application and leaving the patient
“free to leave . . . at any time.”82 Informal committees do not have

73. See id. §§ 9.13, 9.15.
74. See id. §§ 9.27, 9.37.
75. See id. §§ 9.39, 9.40.
76. A helpful chart laying out these different admission procedures can be found
on the New York State Office of Mental Health’s (OMH) website, available at
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/manual/html/mhl_admissions.htm
(last
visited Feb. 25, 2013).
77. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.03 (McKinney 2011); see also id. § 9.11
(requiring patients’ records to be forwarded to Mental Hygiene Legal Service
(MHLS)); id. § 33.13 (defining the required contents of a patient’s file, including any
treatments and any restrictions on patient’s rights, and setting confidentiality
requirements).
78. See, e.g., id. § 9.40 (special procedure for admission to a Comprehensive
Psychiatric Emergency Program (CPEP)).
79. See, e.g., id. § 9.07 (requiring notice to patients of the statutory rights
provided under each admission status); id. § 9.09 (requiring notice to MHLS within
three days of any patient’s change of status or transfer to a different facility).
80. See id. § 9.15.
81. See id. § 9.13.
82. See id. § 9.15; see also Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App.
Div. 3d Dep’t 1980) (finding, in wrongful death action by wife of a patient committed
under § 9.15, that doctors were not liable because they had no right to retain him
after he demanded release).
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their records forwarded to the Mental Hygiene Legal Service83
(“MHLS”) and need not satisfy any dangerousness standard.84 After
requesting to be informally admitted, a prospective committee must
be given notice (1) that the hospital to which he is requesting
admission is a hospital for the mentally ill, (2) that he is applying for
admission, and (3) of the possibility of and conditions for being
converted to involuntary status.85 Any physician in the department
can then examine the prospective committee to determine whether he
meets the informal admission standard.86 At this juncture, the
examining physician may commence procedures to have the person
applying for informal admission committed pursuant to another,
stricter section of Article 9—anything from voluntary to emergency
commitment.87 Every twelve months following informal commitment,
informal and voluntary committees must be reassessed to determine
whether they continue to be in need of care and treatment and are
willing to remain confined; this determination must be communicated
to MHLS, which may request a hearing to challenge it.88 Once every
120 days of hospitalization, the director must re-inform all voluntary
and informal patients of their status and rights, at which time the
patient must give written consent to continued hospitalization.89
These patients are thus reappraised of their rights and given the
opportunity to object to their commitment at least three times per
year.
Voluntary committees must meet the same “need for care and
treatment” standard as informal committees but must make written
application to the hospital director for voluntary status.90 The parent
or guardian of a person under the age of eighteen can submit this
application to request “voluntary” admission on the minor’s behalf.91

83. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.11.
84. See id. § 9.15 (“The director . . . may receive therein as an informal patient
any suitable person in need of care and treatment requesting admission thereto.”).
Section 9.01 defines “in need of care and treatment” as having a mental illness “for
which in-patient . . . treatment is appropriate.” Id. § 9.01.
85. See id. § 9.17(a).
86. See id. § 9.17(b).
87. See id.
88. See id. § 9.25(a).
89. See id. § 9.19.
90. Id. § 9.13(a).
91. Id.; see also Samuel M. Leaf, How Voluntary Is the Voluntary Commitment

of Minors? Disparities in the Treatment of Children and Adults Under New York’s
Civil Commitment Law, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1687, 1716–17 (1996) (arguing that
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A voluntary patient is subject to many of the same procedural
requirements as an informal patient, including entitlement to notice
of possible conversion to involuntary status92 and annual reevaluation
for suitability and willingness.93 Additionally, a voluntary patient’s
medical records, including treatment information specified by Section
33.13, must be forwarded to MHLS within five days of admission.94
This increased oversight is presumably in place because voluntary
patients, unlike informal patients, are not free to leave the hospital at
will, but must submit written notice of their “desire to leave.”95 The
hospital director may then retain the patient for up to seventy-two
hours to apply for an order for retention, which the patient may
contest at a hearing set within three days of the director’s
application.96 If the hearing court finds that the patient is “in need of
retention for involuntary care,” a sixty-day retention order issues, and
the patient’s status is converted to involuntary.97

2.

Involuntary Commitment

Involuntary status can come about through a retention order and
change of status following the director’s refusal to discharge a
voluntary patient, through an emergency commitment for immediate
observation,98 or through a non-emergency involuntary commitment.99
Any of eleven enumerated parties,100 including a family member,
treating psychiatrist, or person residing with the prospective
committee can apply to a hospital to initiate a non-emergency
involuntary commitment.101 Within ten days of this application, two
physicians must examine the committee and certify that he or she is

Sections 9.13 and 9.27 leave enormous power to parents to unnecessarily commit
their children).
92. Id. § 9.17(a).
93. Id. § 9.25(a).
94. Id. § 9.11.
95. Id. § 9.13(b).
96. Id. This hearing is not automatic; if the patient does not request it within five
days of the application, a six-month retention order may be issued uncontested. See
id. § 9.33(b).
97. Id. This order must be issued pursuant to the procedure for retaining an
involuntary committee provided in § 9.33(a), described in Part I.B.4 infra.
98. See infra Part I.B.3.
99. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a).
100. Id. § 9.27(b).
101. Id. § 9.27(a); see also § 9.27(c) (application must contain statement of facts
upon which allegation of mental illness and need for care and treatment are based,
and is executed under penalty of perjury).
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mentally ill and “in need of involuntary care and treatment.”102 This
standard (the “involuntary standard”), while higher than the “care
and treatment” standard for voluntary commitment,103 does not
explicitly require a finding of dangerousness.104 Before certifying the
need for involuntary treatment, both examining physicians are under
a statutory duty to “consider” less restrictive alternatives and, if
possible, to consult with any psychiatrist who has previously treated
the potential committee.105 After certification of the application,
either examining physician can direct police officers to transport the
potential committee to the hospital for further evaluation, and may
request ambulance service for this purpose.106 Before final admission
to the hospital, a third physician must examine the potential
committee to confirm that he or she meets the involuntary standard.107
After final admission, the committee can be held for a maximum of
sixty days, at which time the hospital must either grant discharge or
apply for a retention order.108
Written notice of involuntary
admission must be given “forthwith” to MHLS and to the
committee’s nearest known relative.109
Two aspects of the non-emergency involuntary commitment
procedure warrant particular mention. First, at no point during the
commitment process—application, certification, and admission—is a
judge or non-physician fact-finder involved. A psychiatrist can make
the application, two more psychiatrists can certify it, and a fourth can
102. Id. § 9.27(a) (emphasis added). This examination can be conducted “jointly”
by both certifying physicians. Id.
103. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text.
104. The statute defines the involuntary care and treatment standard as requiring
that the patient “has a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient in a
mental hospital is essential to such person’s welfare and whose judgment is so
impaired that he is unable to understand the need for such care and treatment.” Id. §
9.01. In order to square this standard with O’Connor, New York courts have read
dangerousness into the statute. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Brian H.,
857 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2008); In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359,
364–65 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1983); Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div.
3d Dep’t 1977); see also Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983)
(finding that Section 9.27, as narrowed by New York state courts, withstood a due
process overbreadth challenge).
105. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(d).
106. See id. § 9.27(i).
107. See id. § 9.27(e).
108. See id. § 9.33(a). Involuntary committees can also be converted to voluntary
status at the hospital’s discretion, § 9.23(a), provided that MHLS is notified of the
conversion. Any committee so converted may challenge the conversion at a hearing.
See § 9.23(b).
109. See id. § 9.29.
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confirm admission, before the committee has a chance to request
judicial intervention. Second, although state courts have read a
“substantial threat of harm to self or others” element into the
statutory “involuntary commitment” standard, the plain language of
Article 9 does not require one. Neither the statute nor the courts
specify the severity or imminence of the harm that needs to be
threatened, or whether the threat needs to be manifested by any
objective evidence beyond a psychiatric prognosis.110

3.

Emergency Commitment

In addition to standard voluntary and involuntary commitments,
Article 9 permits emergency admission for “immediate observation,
care, and treatment”111 in either an ordinary psychiatric facility112 or a
CPEP.113 Emergency commitments do not require an application, and
can be effected by any psychiatrist in an OMH-licensed facility,114 or
any hospital director,115 police officer,116 mobile crisis outreach team,117
or through a civil court order,118 upon a finding that an individual

110. See, e.g., Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1977)
(expressly disclaiming the need for an “overt act” to establish the threat of harm).
111. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39. Emergency commitments also can be
effected by application of a director or his designee, using the emergency standard.
See id. § 9.37(a). In counties with fewer than 200,000 residents, this designee may be
either a physician or a certified social worker. See id. § 9.37(c).
112. A facility must receive special certification from the OMH to receive
emergency or CPEP committees. See id. §§ 9.39(a), 9.40(a). There are currently
nineteen hospitals in New York State certified by OMH to receive CPEP committees
under § 9.40, ten of which, including Bellevue, are in New York City. See N.Y. STATE
OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 10 OF NEW YORK STATE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (2008),
available at http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/statistics/forensic/report.pdf.
113. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.40(a).
114. See id. § 9.55.
115. See id. § 9.57.
116. See id. § 9.41. Police officers who determine that a person is suffering from
mental illness “likely to result in serious harm” to self or others are authorized to
detain and transport such person pending psychiatric examination. See id.; see also
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. McMahon, 279 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168–69 (N.D.N.Y. 2003),
aff’d, 124 F. App’x 674 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Section 9.41 police “pick ups” are
functionally arrests, requiring Miranda warnings and allowing criminal background
checks).
117. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.58(a).
118. See id. § 9.43.
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meets a heightened “emergency” standard of dangerousness.119
Within forty-eight hours of initial admission120 a second physician
must examine the committee and confirm that the emergency
standard is satisfied.121 After confirmation, the committee may be
retained for up to fifteen days, at which point he must be either
discharged or converted to non-emergency involuntary status through
the standard involuntary procedure.122 At any time following
confirmation, the committee, any friend or relative, or MHLS may
demand a hearing, which must be granted within five days.123 If the
hearing court finds that the emergency standard is met, it may issue a
retention order for the remainder of the fifteen-day commitment—
this order is considered a finding of “reasonable cause” but not an
adjudication that the committee is mentally ill.124
Admission to a CPEP functions similarly to standard emergency
commitment in that it uses the same standard125 and the same range of
authorized actors initiate the admission, but it differs from emergency
commitment in that a prospective committee may be held for
observation for up to six hours before a psychiatrist examines him.126
If the initial psychiatrist deems that commitment to a CPEP is
appropriate, the committee may be held for up to twenty-four hours
before confirmation by another psychiatrist and transfer to an
119. See id. § 9.39(a). The emergency standard requires a finding that the
prospective committee (1) suffers from a mental illness that is (2) likely to result in
serious harm to himself or others. See id. “Likelihood of serious harm” is defined as
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats
of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct
demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or herself, or (2) a
substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by
homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in
reasonable fear of serious physical harm.
Id. § 9.01.
120. As in a non-emergency involuntary commitment, notice of rights and status
must be given to the committee, MHLS, and the committee’s next relative
immediately upon admission. Id. § 9.39(a).
121. See id.
122. See id. § 9.39(b). Standard Section 9.27 procedure is described in Part I.B.2
supra. If a patient is converted from emergency to involuntary status, their date of
admission for the purposes of the sixty-day involuntary admission period is calculated
from the date of initial admission, rather than conversion. Id. § 9.39(b).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. § 9.40(b). The “likelihood of serious harm” requirement is the same,
but the physician must conclude that the committee is in particular need of CPEP,
rather than standard emergency admission. Id.
126. See id.
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extended observation bed.127 The maximum “extended observation”
period in a CPEP is seventy-two hours, after which time the
committee must be discharged or converted to standard emergency128
or non-emergency involuntary status.129
The emergency standard is the highest threshold of dangerousness
required under Article 9.130 It differs from the lower involuntary
standard in three important respects. First, it explicitly specifies the
need for a finding of harm to self or others, tracking the O’Connor
standard.131 Second, it specifies the severity of the threat, although it
does not specify imminence. Third, it requires the threat to be
manifested by some objective, overt act by the prospective
committee, either in the form of a threat or attempt at suicide or
violent behavior.
This requirement reduces the discretion of
physicians to diagnose dangerousness by resting the legitimacy of an
emergency commitment on factual evidence. The need for a more
objective standard is clear, given that such a broad range of actors can
initiate a commitment, and the allegedly dangerous person can be
initially committed for up to forty-eight hours on the assessment of a
single physician.132

4.

Retention Orders, Release Hearings, and Other Procedural
Protections

New York law affords minimal procedural protections133 to all
voluntarily and involuntarily committed patients by providing notice
of status and rights,134 opportunities for hearings to present and rebut
evidence, and opportunities for judicial review of all commitment

127. See id. § 9.40(c). On transfer to an extended observation bed, notice and
possibility of hearing must be given to the committee under the same procedure as
Section 9.39. See also id. § 31.27(5) (defining “extended observation bed” as an
inpatient bed in or adjacent to an emergency room where the committee’s “acute
psychiatric symptoms” can be stabilized).
128. Id. § 9.40(a), (e).
129. Id. § 9.40(f).
130. Compare id. § 9.13(a) (“need for care and treatment”), with id. § 9.27(a)
(“need for involuntary care and treatment”), and id. § 9.39(a) (“likely to result in
serious harm”).
131. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
132. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a).
133. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494–97 (1980), discussed supra in Part I.B.2.
134. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07(a) (requiring notice of status and rights to
hearing and counsel immediately upon admission or status conversion); id. § 9.07(b)
(requiring notices of rights to be posted conspicuously throughout the facility in
locations visible to all patients).
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decisions,135 and goes beyond the constitutional minimum by
providing state-funded counsel to indigent committees through
MHLS.136 Within the initial sixty-day period of an involuntary
commitment, no automatic hearing is triggered; however, a
committee, their next relative, or MHLS can request one at any time
after receiving notice of involuntary status.137 No involuntary
commitment can continue beyond the initial sixty-day period without
a court order of retention.138 Initial orders of retention can be for up
to six months,139 subsequent orders may be for one year, then two
years at a time.140 Provided the hearing court finds that the committee
continues to meet the involuntary standard, two-year retention orders
may continue to be granted indefinitely.141
If a hearing is requested by or on behalf of a committee, it must be
scheduled within five days.142 The committee, represented by MHLS
or his own counsel, may present evidence to contest the validity of his
involuntary status and cross-examine the hospital’s witness, usually a
psychiatrist.143 If after hearing this evidence the court is satisfied that
retention is appropriate, it may deny release and may order transfer
to another facility; if not, it must order release.144 The court is also
obliged to consider whether the committee has relatives willing and
able to provide appropriate care, in which case it may order release

135. See id. § 9.31 (right to hearing regarding involuntary commitment status,
requiring court to hear testimony); id. § 9.35 (right to review of order authorizing
retention by another court, and appeal that court’s decision).
136. See, e.g., id. § 43.01(a) (waiving fees for patients unable to pay for services);
id. § 15.1 (requiring, as part of the admission process, an assessment of “those social
and economic factors which will impede and those which will facilitate a patient’s
discharge”); see also id. § 47.01 (establishing the responsibilities of MHLS to provide
legal services to all “patients or residents” of a mental facility or “persons alleged to
be in need of care and treatment”); id. § 9.09 (requiring notice to MHLS within three
days of any admission of a new patient or change of a patient’s status); id. § 9.11
(requiring records of all involuntary patients to be forwarded to MHLS).
137. Id. § 9.31(a).
138. Id. § 9.33(a).
139. See id. § 9.33(b).
140. See id. § 9.33(d).
141. See id.
142. See id. § 9.31(c).
143. See id.
144. See id. The facility need not release the patient immediately but must release
them “forthwith.” See id. § 9.31(d).
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into their custody.145 A committee denied release may be retained
under involuntary status for the remainder of his term.146
Both retention orders and denials of release can be reviewed.147
Request of review must be made within thirty days, and may only be
made by the committee or an immediate family member.148 The
review procedure is much more robust than the standard release
hearing, calling for both a supreme court justice (other than the judge
or justice who issued the order) and a jury149 to try the questions of (1)
mental illness and (2) need for involuntary retention.150 If the jury
finds that both of these factual elements are shown by clear and
convincing evidence,151 the committee is adjudged mentally ill and an
order is issued to the hospital authorizing retention for the remainder
of the term.152 The justice presiding over the review may, at his
discretion and after a hearing, stay this order pending an appeal.153
II. PROBLEMS WITH ARTICLE 9, AND MORE PROTECTIVE
ALTERNATIVES
The preceding analysis of Article 9’s procedural labyrinth reveals
that New York State law provides close to the federally mandated
minimum of protection against erroneous commitment. At key stages
of the commitment process, the law devolves decision-making
authority onto physicians and limits committees’ access to lay
decision-makers and judges. This Part will examine the extent to
145. See id. § 9.31(c).
146. See id. A committee may be retained for thirty days after being denied
release regardless of when their initial term ends; denial therefore may result in an
extended term if release is requested with fewer than thirty days remaining on the
retention term. See id. § 9.33(a).
147. See id. § 9.35.
148. See id.
149. Jury review may be waived. See id.
150. See id.
151. This standard of proof is not referenced in Article 9 but is mandated by
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421 (1979).
152. See id.; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35.
153. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35. Only the jury’s finding of a need for
treatment may be appealed; the type of treatment administered and treatment
classification (admission status) may not. See Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 6 N.Y.3d 138,
147–48 (2006). A committee who has been adjudged mentally ill and in need of
treatment by the reviewing jury may not request another review pursuant to § 9.35
during his retention term without establishing some change in legal or factual
circumstances that would enable a fact finder to reconsider the previous reviewing
fact finder’s verdict. See, e.g., In re Launcelot T., 668 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (Sup. Ct.
1997).
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which New York State has chosen to allocate the risk of overcommitment onto its mentally disabled population. Section A will
focus on some key deficiencies built into Article 9. Section B will
survey more protective alternative civil commitment procedures that
other jurisdictions have adopted, noting instances where the Second
Circuit has heard challenges to Article 9 and declined to find
alternative procedural protections necessary to the law’s survival.
A. Delegated Discretion—the Problem with Article 9
Article 9 incorporates the basic procedural requirements for
involuntary commitment under Vitek v. Jones by providing notice of
rights and status, allowing committees to seek judicial review of both
retention orders and demands for early release, requiring notice to
MHLS of all hearings and status changes, and granting MHLS
significant power to request hearings on committees’ behalf.154
Facilitating adversary hearings ostensibly introduces objective, nonmedical decision-makers into the commitment process. Nevertheless,
even as read by state courts to include a dangerousness requirement,
New York law treads close to the constitutional boundaries of
involuntary commitment. Article 9 sets exceedingly broad standards
for commitment, widening the population of New Yorkers who might
qualify as “in need of involuntary care and treatment” and delegating
enormous power to physicians, both as gatekeepers (by controlling
initial admission) and as expert witnesses in hearings for retention.
Because judges tend to defer to their medical expertise,155 a
psychiatrist’s diagnosis can provide all the evidence necessary to
satisfy the legal “dangerousness” standard. Article 9 does little to
restrict this discretion; thus, to whatever extent psychiatrists tend to
erroneously predict dangerousness or misdiagnose patients, New
York errs on the side of over-commitment. Because only the
mentally disabled are eligible for commitment, this burden falls
entirely on them.

154. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
the Article 9 meets Vitek’s “constitutional minima” because of its “elaborate” notice
and hearing provisions).
155. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 284–85 nn.138–39 (describing judges’ deference
to clinical testimony, citing a variety of studies showing that judges defer to
psychiatric recommendations between ninety and one hundred percent of the time);
see also William Hoffman Pincus, Note, Civil Commitment and the “Great
Confinement” Revisited: Straightjacketing Individual Rights Stifling Culture, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1769, 1806–07 (1995) (citing a similar study).
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Other states have chosen to err on the side of under-commitment.
In recognition of the need to provide more procedural protections—
such as those under criminal law—to their disabled populations, some
state legislatures have enacted stricter commitment statutes,
incorporating higher burdens of proof and standards of
dangerousness or requiring objective evidence, rather than mere
diagnosis, to establish the need for commitment. State and federal
courts have adopted similar rights-protective measures through
judicial doctrines. The next section will examine these measures in
comparison with New York’s commitment law, starting with a
foundational federal case, Lessard v. Schmidt.156
B.

More Protective Alternatives

As the Supreme Court has defined, involuntary civil commitment
laws must strike two important balances, both of which allocate
burdens between the State and the mentally disabled individual: first,
they must set a substantive definition of “dangerousness” that
determines what particular evidence must be produced to support a
commitment, defining the class of “dangerous” individuals;157 second,
they must set a burden of proof, allocating the risk of an erroneous
“dangerous” classification.158 Since these broad guidelines were first
enunciated in the 1970s, both the Supreme Court159 and academic
commentators160 have consistently noted that, when striking these
balances, courts and legislatures must account for the role that
psychologists and clinical testimony will play in establishing mental
illness and dangerousness. A vague definition of “danger to self or

156. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
157. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), discussed supra notes 27–41
and accompanying text.
158. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), discussed supra notes 42-56
and accompanying text.
159. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495–96 (1980) (recognizing that “[t]he
question whether an individual is mentally ill” and requires treatment “turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and
psychologists,” but that “[t]he medical nature of the inquiry . . . does not justify
dispensing with due process requirements” including adversary hearings before a
neutral fact-finder).
160. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers:

Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental
Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329 (1992) (noting a legal tendency to delegate
decisionmaking to mental health professionals).
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others” or lack of a requirement that dangerousness must be
established by any objective evidence (such as an overt act) may
allow commitment based solely on the clinical testimony of one or
two examining psychologists.161 To cut back on that delegation of
discretion, jurisdictions outside New York have implemented a
variety of protective measures to shift fact-finding to judicial, rather
than clinical, decision-makers.162
These measures include (1)
mandatory, rather than optional, judicial review of all non-emergency
commitments; (2) elevated standards of proof; (3) more specific
standards of “dangerousness,” including requirements relating to
likelihood, severity and imminence of potential harm; and (4)
requiring objective evidence in addition to clinical opinion, such as a
recent overt act, to establish dangerousness. This Part considers each
in turn.

1.

Automatic Hearings

Lessard v. Schmidt,163 one of the first cases to overturn a state’s
commitment statute on due process grounds, recognized that the
quasi-criminal nature of involuntary commitment meant it could only
be accomplished through an adversarial hearing.164 The Lessard court
reasoned that because the liberty interests at stake in a civil
commitment are analogous to those at stake in a criminal
prosecution,165 neither could be accomplished without a prior

161. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 293 (“[I]n the absence of statutory language or a
judicial opinion clarifying the meaning of ‘danger,’ a clinician can interpret any threat
to cause harm as creating a danger, regardless of the remoteness of the threat.”); see
also Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Neb. 1975) (finding that an overly
vague commitment statute “combine[d] the investigative, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative functions in one authority and denie[d] the subject due process of law”).
162. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 445 (1992)
(discussing the respective abilities of judicial and clinical authorities to be “neutral
factfinders,” and concluding that clinical authorities tend to be more prone to bias).
The problem of commitment bias among psychiatric professionals is especially
troubling given the demonstrated deference afforded to clinical testimony by judges.
See supra note 153; infra Part II.B.4.
163. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
164. See id. at 1088–89 (dismissing “the civil-criminal distinction” between
deprivations of liberty).
165. See id. at 1089–90 (identifying loss of civil rights, hazards of
institutionalization, and stigma as implicated interests). In its discussion of the
consequences that could follow from even a brief erroneous commitment, the court
cites testimony that “in the job market, it is better to be an ex-felon than [an] ex-
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hearing.166 Although the Court recognized that temporary emergency
confinement could be necessary in some circumstances, it set a 48hour time limit on such commitments,167 and held categorically that
commitment for any longer period “cannot be permitted under our
Constitution without a hearing.”168 This unconditional language is
understandable in the context of the analogy to criminal prosecutions;
clearly, adjudication of guilt is a mandatory, not optional, prerequisite
to incarceration. Although the Supreme Court in Vitek did not
explicitly require automatic hearings prior to commitment,169 other
courts have followed Lessard in holding that hearings must be
automatically triggered within a short time after any involuntary
commitment.170 State legislatures have imposed similar requirements
by statute.171
Article 9 allows commitment for up to sixty days without a hearing,
unless MHLS, the committee, or, in some cases, a family member
requests one.172 If a committee is unwilling or unable to request a
hearing, by reason of his illness or simple mistrust of the system, and
MHLS fails or does not have the resources to request a hearing on his
behalf, his liberty is in the hands of the physicians until the mandatory
retention hearing is triggered. This state of affairs amounts to a
presumption that the committed individual has waived the right to a
hearing and acquiesces to treatment until he objects. Nevertheless,
when the Second Circuit addressed Article 9’s hearing provisions in
Project Release,173 it held that the statute’s lack of an automatic

patient.” See id. at 1089 (citing Hearings Before S. Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights, 91st Cong. 284 (1970) (statement of Bruce J. Ennis, ACLU)).
166. See id. at 1091.
167. See id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (holding only that adversary
hearings must be held sufficiently after notice to let the prospective committee
prepare).
170. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (seven-day
limit for a probable cause hearing), aff’d, 657 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1981); Kendall
v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 419 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (full hearing within twenty-one days);
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (finding Nebraska’s civil
commitment statute deficient in “failing to require a full and formal hearing on the
necessity for commitment to be held within a reasonable time,” and setting a
fourteen-day limit (emphasis added)).
171. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 n.14 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
state statutes that require prompt, automatic hearings).
172. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(a) (McKinney 2011), discussed supra in
Part I.B.4.
173. 722 F.2d 960.
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preliminary hearing satisfied due process.174 This holding was based
partly on a rejection of the analogy between civil and criminal
confinement,175 and partly on an optimistic assessment that the “layers
of professional review” by physicians would be sufficient to screen
out erroneous commitments even without automatic judicial
intervention.176 As this Note177 will demonstrate, this assessment may
place too much confidence in the ability of physicians to serve as
objective fact-finders.

2.

Elevated Standards of Proof

Lessard also held that the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all facts necessary to show that an individual is mentally ill and
dangerous.178 The Supreme Court in Addington subsequently held
that a clear and convincing standard could satisfy minimum due
process;179 however, at least one state elected to impose the higher
standard.180 The Court has explicitly condoned this practice as within
states’ discretion.181 Some commentators have suggested that the
Court should reconsider the Addington minimum in light of
developments in diagnostic abilities;182 regardless, it is fully within the
legislative power of New York State to raise the standard and allocate
174. See id. at 973–74.
175. See id. at 974–75 (“We acknowledge the deprivation of liberty involved in
involuntary civil commitment, but we are not prepared to invoke the same
procedural standards required in the criminal context.”).
176. See id. at 975 (finding that notice to relatives, combined with the availability
of a hearing, was sufficient).
177. See infra Part II.B.4.
178. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (D.
Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
179. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
180. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2) (West 2011); see also Messer v.
Roney, 772 S.W.2d 648, 649–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (justifying the higher standard of
proof by analogy between the loss of liberty in civil and criminal confinements).
181. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (holding that Kentucky statutes
imposing a “reasonable doubt” standard for commitment of the mentally ill, but a
“clear and convincing” standard for commitment of the mentally retarded, do not
violate equal protection because the comparative difficulty in diagnosing mental
illness, and more invasive treatment, provide a rational basis for allocating less of the
risk of error to the mentally ill); id. at 341 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case
Kentucky has determined that the liberty of those alleged to be mentally ill is
sufficiently precious that the State should assume the risk inherent in use of that
higher standard.”).
182. See Tsesis, supra note 71, at 254–55.
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less risk to its enormous disabled population.183 The Project Release
court recognized this, but reiterated its reliance on Addington in
refusing to equate civil and criminal confinement.184

3.

The Definition of “Danger”

The O’Connor dangerousness standard reduced the discretion of
legislatures to confine “inconvenient” individuals at will,185 but much
of that reduction may be illusory to the extent that states can define
what “dangerous” means or simply shift the discretion to commit into
the hands of physicians.186 Most state civil commitment statutes
provide a more specific standard than mere “danger.”187 These
specifications tend to incorporate different “components of the
dangerousness determination”: probability, imminence, and
magnitude of harm.188 Stricter definitions of both danger and mental
illness would require all three of these components to be statutorily
defined—it would require, for example, a finding that danger is
certain or reasonably certain, imminent, and that the resulting harm
would be serious—but few states incorporate all three. 189 Article 9
provides few substantive definitions, and notably leaves “mental
illness” completely undefined.190 The emergency standard defines the

183. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 341 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n this case
Kentucky has determined that the liberty of those alleged to be mentally ill is
sufficiently precious that the State should assume the risk inherent in use of that
higher standard.”).
184. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974–75 (2d Cir. 1983). The
Second Circuit cited the Addington Court’s observation that, because the mentally ill
may be deprived of “needed medical treatment” by an erroneous failure to commit,
the reasonable doubt standard could create too high a barrier to the State’s ability to
forcibly administer that treatment. See id.
185. See supra Part I.A.1.
186. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 261–65 (arguing that, in part because of vague
definitions of danger, the post-O’Connor “narrowing of commitment statutes failed
to result in a decrease in the instances of commitment, which suggests that tighter
standards and procedures have not been applied in practice”).
187. See People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772–73 nn.4–8 (Colo. 1988) (surveying
different states’ commitment standards).
188. See Brooks, supra note 21, at 265; cf. Christyne E. Ferris, Note, The Search

for Due Process in Civil Commitment Hearings: How Procedural Realities Have
Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L. REV. 959, 966–67 (2008) (identifying the
three components as type, immediacy, and likelihood of danger).
189. See Ferris, supra note 188, at 967 (citing BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 61–64 (2005)).
190. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 2011); see also Christopher
Slobogin, Rethinking Legally Relevant Mental Disorder, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 497,
498 (2003) (arguing that mental disorder is “such a vacuous phrase that the law
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degree (“serious”) and likelihood (“substantial risk”) of harm, but
not its imminence.191 This absence of definition could be significant;
under the existing standard a person diagnosed with any disorder that
creates a long-term risk of dangerous behavior could be committed
even if there is no evidence that he will commit a harmful act in the
near future. Even more problematic, the non-emergency involuntary
standard doesn’t define any of the three guidelines, but requires only
that a need for treatment be found.192 The addition of “risk of harm
to self or others” to this standard in Scopes, which the Second Circuit
found saved the standard from unconstitutional overbroadness,193 is
similarly vague. 194 By comparison, other courts, including Lessard195
and the Ninth Circuit,196 have rejected similarly vague state
commitment standards as inadequate to justify a police power-based
confinement.197 Oregon courts are similarly strict about how severe
the threat to self must be to justify a parens patriae confinement.198
As the Oregon cases demonstrate, meeting the higher substantive
standard will generally require more evidence to be produced,199

should consider dispensing with it” altogether and simply identify specific disorders
for commitment purposes); cf. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxi (4th ed. 1994) (“[N]o definition adequately
specifies the precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental disorder.’”).
191. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a).
192. See id. §§ 9.01, 9.27.
193. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973–74 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
New York State civil commitment scheme, considered as a whole and as interpreted
in Scopes to include a showing of dangerousness, meets minimum due process
standards . . . .”).
194. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the involuntary standard).
195. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (“[T]he state must bear the burden of proving that there is an
extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to
himself or others.” (emphasis added)). The court goes on to define that the degree of
harm must be “substantial.” Id.
196. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (overturning a state
standard for failing to explicitly require a finding of imminence).
197. See id. (“[D]anger must be imminent to justify involuntary commitment.”).
198. See, e.g., State v. D.P., 144 P.3d 1044, 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding threat
must be of serious harm to self “in the near future”).
199. See id. (overturning a commitment that had been based on past threats of selfharm and reluctance to take antipsychotic medication, because the state had not
carried its burden to introduce evidence of (1) a past pattern of destructive behavior
and (2) that the pattern is beginning again); see also State v. L.P., 160 P.3d 634, 638
(Or. Ct. App. 2007) (overturning a commitment based on “speculative or
conjectural” evidence of imminence). In both of these cases, the Oregon court found
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placing a higher burden on the state and restricting a diagnostician’s
ability to “shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any
person he wishes.”200 Stricter definitions would thereby reduce the
portion of the mentally disabled population who are eligible for
involuntary commitment, and New York courts are free to implement
them.201

4.

Procedural Standards—Objective Evidence

In addition to substantive “dangerousness” definitions that
determine what the state must prove in order to commit, procedural
requirements may constrain how the state can meet its burden.202
These procedural requirements entail evidentiary rules that either
may be imposed explicitly by statute203 or implied by judicial
doctrine.204 Most state commitment statutes, including Article 9,
require clinical testimony to support a commitment.205 However,
courts and commentators have long observed the general inability of
prognostic clinical testimony alone to accurately predict
dangerousness.206 This inability is partly a consequence of the inexact
expert testimony by psychiatrists to be too equivocal to prove imminence by clear
and convincing evidence; notably, the Oregon statute they were interpreting does not
include an imminence requirement, but courts have implied one. See L.P., 160 P.3d at
637 n.4.
200. See Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1094 (quoting Joseph M. Livermore et. al., On
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968)).
201. See generally Slobogin, supra note 190, at 504 (“No less an authority than the
U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that judges and legislatures, not psychiatrists or
other mental health professionals, should define the scope of legally relevant mental
disorder.” (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997))).
202. See Ferris, supra note 188, at 976 (describing how higher evidentiary burdens
can increase the effectiveness of substantive “dangerousness” standards).
203. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(2) (2011) (requiring an “imminent
threat” to be proven by “overt acts or omissions”); see also Alexander Scherr,
Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43 n.210 (2003) (surveying state statutes that require overt acts).
204. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The proper standard is
that which requires a finding of imminent and substantial danger as evidenced by a
recent overt act, attempt, or threat.” (quoting Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1110
(D. Haw. 1977))); see also Scherr, supra note 203, at 43–49 (surveying judicial
doctrines requiring various “overt” and “recent overt” act requirements to support
findings of dangerousness).
205. See Scherr, supra note 203, at 37–40 (surveying statutes and judicial doctrines
requiring expert testimony at commitment hearings).
206. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (“It is precisely the subtleties
and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses that justify the requirement of adversary
hearings.”) (quotations omitted); see also Scherr, supra note 203, at 40–41
(concluding that most courts find expert diagnosis alone insufficient to justify

GROENDYK_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 5:50 PM

2012] NY’S INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT LAW

579

nature of diagnosis itself; medical science in its current state simply is
not equipped to foresee an individual’s future behavior. It may also
owe to professional biases inherent to psychiatrists, who tend to face
strong incentives to over-commit disabled individuals who come
under their care.207 These incentives stem from a combination of
stereotyping,208 fear of liability,209 and treatment bias.210 Recognizing
these strong incentives, other states have imposed evidentiary
burdens to restrict physicians’ discretion and shift commitment
decisions to non-physician fact-finders, namely juries and judges.
Evidentiary burdens take different forms, but generally consist of
some additional fact or facts that must be established to provide an
objective supplement to clinical testimony.211 Commentators have
proposed requiring actuarial evidence or “structured” clinical
evaluation to support the traditional “unstructured” clinical
testimony.212 More commonly, state legislatures and courts will

commitment); Brooks, supra note 21, at 269 (“Authorities in legal and medical
journals have detailed, with much empirical support, that psychiatrists lack the ability
to assess danger proficiently. This lack of skill has resulted in mental health
professionals overpredicting instances of harmful behavior.”); Phyllis Coleman &
Ronald A. Shellow, Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—Proposed Guidelines
to Provide Rational Test for Physician’s Liability, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 644 (1992)
(“[P]redictions of the likelihood a specific individual will commit suicide are wrong
far more often than they are right.”).
207. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 1, at 28–29 (detailing various motivations
physicians have to over-commit, including moral concerns and stereotyping).
208. See id.; see also Bersoff, supra note 160, at 336–37 (discussing how heuristic
reasoning that characterizes professional assessments of dangerous may cause
professional physicians to be “more susceptible to error than . . . trainees and
sometimes even lay decisionmakers”); Michael Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV.
373, 393–96 (1992) (detailing different “sanist” tropes, such as the one that a refusal
to take antipsychotic medication indicates dangerousness).
209. See Michael Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New
Directions for the 1990’s, 16 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 57–58, 61–62 (1992) (describing
how “litigaphobia” may cause psychiatrists to prefer to err on the side of committing
potentially dangerous individuals).
210. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 28–29; see also Brooks, supra note 21, at 265
(“[W]hen psychiatrists learn the legal system imposes few constraints on their clinical
decision-making, they tend to disregard the law and permit their clinical judgment to
dictate how they will act.”); Coleman & Shellow, supra note 206, at 654 (noting that,
even using the most accurate available predictive models, “the physician will predict
suicide twenty-five times for every death that will occur”).
211. See Scherr, supra note 203, at 41.
212. See id. at 15–22 (describing the relative benefits of clinical assessments, which
rely purely on psychiatrists’ professional judgment, and actuarial models, which have
been empirically shown to be more accurate as applied to groups but not individuals,
and advocating that actuarial predictors should be incorporated into clinical
assessments to provide an improved “structured clinical” testimony to establish
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require objective evidence in the form of an “overt” or “recent” act
demonstrating dangerousness.213 Article 9’s involuntary standard,
even as read by Scopes, does not explicitly require an overt act, and
the Project Release court declined to require one.214 The Second
Circuit’s holding in a subsequent case, Rodriguez v. City of New
York,215 may effectively imply an overt act requirement into the
standard in some cases by requiring that diagnoses meet with
“standards generally accepted by the medical community” in order to
satisfy due process.216 Because compliance with “standards generally
accepted by the medical community” is a question of fact, plaintiffs
may introduce testimony to show that diagnostic standards require
objective, overt evidence of danger to support a diagnosis.217 In
general, however, neither the courts nor the legislature in New York
have required objective evidence of dangerousness as a blanket
prerequisite to involuntary commitment.
The comparison with rights-protective devices that other states’
civil commitment laws employ reveals that New York has chosen to
delegate fact finding to physicians and allocate the risk of erroneous
commitment to the mentally disabled population to the maximum
extent the O’Connor/Addington framework allows. In the absence of
more meaningful substantive and procedural protections, erroneously
committed individuals are left to enforce their rights ex post by
bringing lawsuits against physicians. As Part III will demonstrate, this
form of enforcement has significant limitations, but it may also be a
productive way to cut against physicians’ incentives to over-commit

dangerousness). Professor Scherr goes on to conclude that predictive psychiatric
testimony should still be admitted in commitment hearings, but should be subjected
to a Daubert-like test for reliability that would likely require some incorporation of
objective or actuarial criteria. See id. at 88–89.
213. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text; see also Project Release v.
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting a split among federal courts on
whether an overt act must be shown in order to satisfy O’Connor).
214. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 974.
215. 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995).
216. See id. at 1062 (“In thus declining [in Project Release] to find the statutory
scheme as a whole facially invalid in the absence of an overt-act requirement, we did
not purport to hold that due process would never impose an overt-act requirement
with respect to any particular section of the statute as applied.” (emphasis added)).
217. See Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (plaintiffs
introduced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact that psychiatrists
performing evaluations without considering recent overt acts failed to comport with
“standards generally accepted by the medical community”).
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and indirectly shape a “limiting norm” on the state’s power to
commit.218
III. CIVIL RIGHTS L ITIGATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARY
TO A RTICLE 9
In the absence of more protective state law, wrongly committed
New Yorkers are left to litigate the adequacy of the substantive and
procedural standards under which they were committed in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.219 This case-by-case enforcement for damages cannot
change the law the way a facial challenge would, but it does give fact
finders the chance to examine Article 9’s standards as applied. In
addition to allowing committees to vindicate their rights individually,
these cases set precedent that may indirectly shape the way physicians
apply the standards in the future.
A. Potential Benefits of Case-by-Case Litigation
Civil rights suits for damages provide an incentive to individual
committees, and (thanks to fee-shifting statutes)220 to private
attorneys, to litigate the constitutionality of particular involuntary
commitments after the fact.
This approach can compensate
individuals who are swept into the system under Article ’9’s
overbroad standard without requiring action by the legislature or any
narrowing of the legislature’s discretion by federal courts. Although
this strategy does not change the scope of physicians’ discretion under
the letter of Article 9, it does create the prospect that the methods
used to diagnose “danger to self or others” will be called into
question in a post-commitment lawsuit. Plaintiffs and private
attorneys can present competing expert testimony as to what
constitutes “danger” and what kind and quality of evidence can be
used to establish “danger.”221 This kind of “battle of experts” comes
218. See James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 422–23 (2003) (noting the role of constitutional tort
actions in forming substantive norms relating “the government’s ability to injure”).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a pubic entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”).
220. See id. §§ 1988(b), 12205 (allowing courts to award fees to the “prevailing
party” in an action commenced pursuant to § 1983 and § 12132, respectively).
221. See Rodriguez v. New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A rational
jury could, for example, reject the proposition that it is consistent with the generally
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much closer to the “adversarial” process that the Supreme Court
endorsed in Vitek222 than the usual Article 9 hearing in which one
doctor, employed by the hospital petitioning for retention,223 gives all
the medical testimony. Allowing a non-physician fact finder to
choose between a plaintiff’s and a defendant’s expert’s definition of
“danger” combats the influence of physicians’ inherent biases. It also
makes the adequacy of any particular diagnosis an open question,
which gives physicians an incentive to lean toward the “highest
common denominator” of diagnostic methods—in other words, the
fear of liability could encourage physicians to use the strictest
methods and highest standards of “danger” that any expert might
credibly espouse at a subsequent trial. Fear of a wider range of postcommitment liability could therefore create ex ante incentives to
exercise more care (including longer examinations, different
definitions of “conduct” or “serious harm,” etc.) to cut against the
many incentives to over-commit.224
While the Second Circuit has rejected facial challenges to Article
9’s standards,225 it has been more open than other courts of appeals to
allowing constitutional claims to proceed against physicians and
hospitals that make erroneous commitments.226 In Rodriguez v. City
of New York, the Second Circuit adopted an objective professional
standard of care for psychiatrists making involuntary commitments.227
The court allowed a § 1983 claim to proceed to trial where the
plaintiff, Rodriguez, had produced expert testimony that her
purportedly suicidal thoughts could not constitute “conduct”228
indicating danger to self, and that the hospital’s physician had spent
insufficient time with Rodriguez to have made a meaningful

accepted standards of the medical profession to order an emergency involuntary
commitment on the basis of ‘vague ideation’ . . . .”).
222. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980); supra Part I.A.2.
223. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(c); supra notes 142–46 and accompanying
text.
224. See supra Part II.B.4.
225. See supra Part II.B.4.
226. Compare Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1066 (allowing a claim to proceed to trial to
determine based on expert testimony whether physician’s conduct deviated from
professional standards), with Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 175
(3d Cir. 2004) (upholding a grant of summary judgment on a similar claim because
physician’s conduct did not “shock the conscience” as a mater of law).
227. See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1065; see also Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 144
(2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming Rodriguez).
228. See Rodriguez, 72 F.3d at 1057.
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diagnosis.229 Because her expert considered the defendant’s brief
examination and broad definition of “conduct” to have “deviated
substantially” from the standards of the medical community, the court
held that a jury was competent to decide that the deviation
constituted a violation of her rights under substantive due process.230
In a civil rights suit under Rodriguez, the proper “standard of the
medical community” is a triable question of fact, which at least partly
eliminates physicians’ discretion to define danger by shifting the
question to a “battle of the experts.” Other courts have reduced this
discretion-checking potential by adopting a “shocks the conscience”
standard under which a committing physician’s conduct must be
egregious or malicious, rather than professionally subpar, to be
actionable.231 This is plainly a much higher evidentiary bar, with the
consequence that claims are more likely to fail early on summary
judgment. Notably, however, the Second Circuit recently reaffirmed
the Rodriguez standard, leaving liability for physicians applying
Article 9 as a legitimate possibility.232
B.

Limitations on Case-by-Case Litigation

The obvious drawback to § 1983 and ADA Title II suits is that, for
individuals, these suits can provide only a remedy and do not offer
preemptive protection. The specter of liability may indirectly impact
physicians’ conduct generally, but case-by-case litigation can never
have the same protective effect as an elevated legal standard of
danger or burden of proof that applies in all cases. For individual
civil rights claimants like Ms. Rodriguez, § 1983 can provide
vindication but not protection.
Another, more practical barrier to suits against psychiatrists may
be the necessity of providing expert testimony. No cost-shifting
statute exists for experts under § 1983;233 nevertheless, expert
evidence is generally necessary to create a triable issue of fact under

229. Id. at 1056.
230. See id. at 1064; see also Jensen v. Lane County, 312 F.3d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
2002) (importing the Rodriguez analysis).
231. See Benn, 371 F.3d at 175 (upholding a grant of summary judgment under a
“shocks the conscience” test); James v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., No. 975157, 1998 WL 66315, at *7 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (same).
232. See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 144 (citing Benn and James but concluding that “the
reasoning of those cases does not persuade us that Rodriguez is no longer good
law”).
233. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2006).
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the Rodriguez standard.234 Plaintiffs wishing to bring a civil rights
claim against a hospital must find not only a lawyer willing to
represent them, but one with the resources to pay an expert witness.
Finally, it should be noted that New York State has a practice of
billing and aggressively countersuing patients who sue its hospitals,
usually to collect medical bills that can often be enormous.235 Even if
an ex-patient wins her erroneous commitment suit, she could end up
stuck with medical bills that outweigh her award.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing examination of Article 9 demonstrates, New
York’s legislature has chosen to provide minimal constitutional
protection to its mentally disabled population’s right to be free from
unnecessary commitment. The Supreme Court’s framework for due
process protection, including the broad standards for quality and
quantity of proof of “danger” that can justify an involuntary
commitment, leaves space for states to delegate commitment
authority to physicians. New York’s legislature has chosen to do so to
a much higher degree than some other states, despite the large
percentage of New Yorkers who could potentially be subject to
“mentally disabled” status.236 In particular, by failing to identify what
degree of severity or imminence of harm constitutes “danger to self
or others” and by declining to require any quantum of objective
evidence of mental illness (in the form of an overt act, for example),
Article 9’s commitment standards leave patients’ freedom in the
hands of a small group of physicians and potentially at the mercy of
institutional bias. So far the Second Circuit, the controlling federal
jurisdiction for New York, has been reluctant to directly question
Article 9, but has shown a greater willingness than other courts to
indirectly affect the commitment standard by leaving psychiatrists
open to constitutional tort claims. This can work to patients’
advantage, and New York lawyers advocating for the mentally
234. See Olivier v. Robert L. Yaeger Mental Health Ctr., 398 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.
2005) (finding that jury was not competent to assess whether commitment deviated
substantially from the standards of the medical community without expert
testimony); cf. id. at 192 (Raggi, C.J., dissenting) (“I do not understand the court
today to be holding that expert testimony is an absolute prerequisite to establishing a
due process challenge to involuntary commitment.”).
235. See Allison Leigh Cowan, Hospitals Send Bill if Mental Patients Win Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/25/nyregion/
25damages.html.
236. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
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disabled should pursue civil rights suits in order to add a second line
of defense to the efforts of Mental Hygiene Legal Services. Until the
standards are tightened or medical science gets better at predicting
violence, post-commitment § 1983 claims are the best way for New
York’s mentally disabled population to protect itself from prejudice
and medical overreach.

